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STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
The amici curiae are prominent professors of international arbitration and 
international law.1  Their primary interest is in the accurate interpretation of the 1958 
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (“New York Convention” or “Convention”), the mainstay of commercial 
and investment arbitration in the United States and around the world.2 
The amici submit this brief to highlight several issues raised by the District 
Court’s failure to properly interpret the United States’ obligations under Article VI 
of the New York Convention.3  The District Court’s statement in its first stay 
decision4 and its decision continuing the stay,5 that it has “not ruled on its 
jurisdiction” and is “not in a position to issue a stay pursuant to the New York 
Convention,” reveals the error in its decision:  by declining to exercise its jurisdiction 
 
1  This brief has been prepared by individuals affiliated with McGill University 
Faculty of Law, Notre Dame Law School, and New York University School 
of Law, but does not purport to present the schools’ institutional views, if any. 
2  United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (June 10, 1958.) 
3  New York Convention art. VI, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 
38 (“If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been 
made to a competent authority referred to in article V(1)(e), the authority 
before which the award is sought to be relied upon may, if it considers it 
proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award and may also, 
on the application of the party claiming enforcement of the award, order the 
other party to give suitable security.”). 
4  Hulley Enters. Ltd. v. Russian Fed’n, 211 F. Supp. 3d 269, 286 (D.D.C. 2016). 
5  Hulley Enters. Ltd. v. Russian Fed’n, No. 14-cv-1996 (BAH), 2020 WL 




to determine whether the Convention applies to this case, the District Court denied 
the benefits of the Convention to the Petitioners-Appellants and applied an erroneous 
standard to its stay determination.  The District Court’s ruling is contrary both to the 
purposes of the Convention (and the obligations arising thereunder) and to the 
United States’ public policy favoring arbitration.   
Amicus curiae Andrea K. Bjorklund is Associate Dean, Graduate Studies, 
the L. Yves Fortier Chair in International Arbitration and International Commercial 
Law, and a Full Professor at McGill University Faculty of Law.  A graduate of Yale 
Law School (J.D.), she clerked on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 
Prior to entering the academy she worked, inter alia, as an attorney-adviser at the 
U.S. Department of State.  An elected member of the American Law Institute, she 
was an adviser to the Project on Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial 
Arbitration.  She is a prolific author in investment law and arbitration and an active 
arbitrator and expert, as well as a member of the Bars of Maryland, the District of 
Columbia, and the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Amicus curiae Diane Desierto (J.S.D., Yale Law School) is Professor of Law 
and Global Affairs and L.L.M. Faculty Director at Notre Dame Law School, jointly 
appointed to the Keough School of Global Affairs, and Faculty Fellow at five 
Institutes at the University of Notre Dame.  She serves as editorial board member at 




Investment and Trade, International Law Studies, Wolters Kluwer International Law 
monographs, various Asian law journals; arbitrator, British Virgin Islands 
Arbitration Centre; Academic Council Member, Institute of Transnational 
Arbitration; 2010-2011 Law Clerk, International Court of Justice; 2017 Faculty 
Director Hague Academy of International Law; and Expert, Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United Nations (“U.N.”). 
Amicus curiae Franco Ferrari is Professor of Law and Executive Director of 
the Center for Transnational Litigation, Arbitration, and Commercial Law at New 
York University School of Law.  Professor Ferrari taught as full professor at Tilburg 
University (Netherlands), as well as Bologna University and Verona University 
(Italy).  He has published around 300 research works on conflict of laws, forum 
shopping, international commercial arbitration, and international business 
transactions.  Formerly Legal Officer at the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, 
International Trade Law Division, Professor Ferrari is also an active international 
arbitrator in international commercial and investment disputes; member of the 
editorial board of various peer reviewed European law journals; and Co-Editor of 
the Encyclopedia of Private International Law (2017). 





RULE 29(a)(4)(E) STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E) and D.C. Circuit R. 29(a)(4)(E), the 
amici curiae state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, 
and no party or counsel for a party contributed money intended to fund the 
preparation or submission of this brief.  No person other than the amici curiae 
contributed money intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Staying enforcement of an arbitral award pending a decision by a court in the 
place of arbitration is unusual; staying enforcement of an arbitral award for more 
than six years is almost unheard-of.6  The continued stay of proceedings in this case 
ignores the fact that arbitral awards are presumptively enforceable; non-enforcement 
is the exception rather than the rule.   
Thus, this case involves an issue of fundamental importance to the deliberate 
design of the Convention, which was also “the principal purpose underlying 
 
6  See Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 146 F. Supp. 3d 112, 
135 (D.D.C. 2015) [hereafter, ‘Gold Reserve’] (“The BIT, ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules, and New York Convention all require immediate satisfaction 
of arbitral awards. Gold Reserve first filed its request for arbitration in October 
2009 — over six years ago — and the dispute with Venezuela involves 
investments made as far back as 1992. Given these delays, the goal of ensuring 





American adoption and implementation of it,”7 namely, “to encourage the 
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international 
contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed 
and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.”8  The New York 
Convention overhauled the regime under the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration 
Clauses, and also the 1927 Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(“Geneva Convention”).9  The Geneva Convention required confirmation of 
awards in the country where the arbitration took place before awards became 
enforceable in other jurisdictions.  This double exequatur system produced lengthy 
delays in award creditors’ abilities to enforce awards.  The 1958 New York 
Convention—to which the United States is a party—was deliberately designed to 
eliminate double exequatur.  The District Court’s decision to further stay its 
proceedings to await resolution of set-aside proceedings in The Hague, in effect, 
judicially legislates the double exequatur requirement that the New York 
Convention eliminated.  This reading of Article VI contradicts the text of Article VI 
 
7  Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974) [hereafter, 
‘Scherk’]. 
8  Id. 
9  Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Geneva, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 157 
[hereafter, ‘Geneva Protocol’]; Convention on the Execution of Foreign 





and the spirit of the Convention, as does any so-called presumption exempting a 
sovereign from providing security in the event a stay is granted. 
ARGUMENT 
In Part I of this brief, the amici curiae discuss (i) the historical background 
of the New York Convention, highlighting its eradication of the double exequatur 
requirement in the Geneva Convention, (ii) the deviation by way of the District 
Court’s decision to perpetuate a de facto presumptive stay from United States courts’ 
pro-enforcement stance, and (iii) the Court’s duty to assess bases for granting a stay 
beyond the mere filing of a set-aside application in the country where the award was 
made, and in particular the likelihood of success of that set-aside petition.  Part II 
demonstrates that the text and practice on Article VI of the New York Convention 
do not support provide for a presumption against a sovereign being obligated to 





I. The New York Convention’s General Framework 
At stake in this case is the New York Convention’s pro-enforcement policy, 
in particular, the “policy of favoring enforcement of foreign arbitral awards”10 
underlying the Convention’s Articles III et seq. 
This “underlying [policy] of the New York Convention . . . to reduce the 
hurdles and produce a uniform, simple and speedy system for enforcement of foreign 
arbitral award”11 distinguishes the New York Convention from its predecessors, the 
1923 Geneva Protocol and 1927 Geneva Convention.12  The New York Convention 
eliminated several hurdles to the seamless cross-border enforcement of arbitral 
awards by introducing improvements, including (i) establishing a presumption as to 
the binding nature of arbitral awards, (ii) reversing the burden of proving the validity 
or invalidity of awards from the award-creditor to the award-debtor,13 (iii) mandating 
summary recognition procedures, and (iv) giving “the authority before which the 
award was sought to be relied upon the right to order the party opposing the 
enforcement to give suitable security.”14  
 
10  Admart AG v. Stephen & Mary Birch Found., Inc., 457 F.3d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
11  Bharat Aluminium v. Kaiser Aluminium, (2012) 9 SCC 552, ¶ 149 (India). 
12  See supra n.9. 
13  See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de l’Industrie 
du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974) [hereafter, ‘Parsons’]. 
14  United Nations, Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, 





More importantly, however, the drafters of the New York Convention 
eliminated the double exequatur requirement that had previously existed under the 
Geneva Convention.  This may well be “the most important effect of the New York 
Convention.”15  As a consequence, “no leave for enforcement in the country of origin 
is required under the New York Convention”16 before an award can be enforced in 
a secondary jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, “[w]hile the Geneva Convention . . . did not circumscribe the 
range of available defenses [to the enforcement of an award] to those enumerated in 
the convention, the [New York] Convention clearly . . . limited [those] defenses to 
seven set forth in Article V.”17 
These improvements evidence the Convention’s “basic thrust . . . to liberalize 
procedures for enforcing foreign arbitral awards.”18  In light of this, and the 
Convention’s provisions regarding recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, 
 
¶ 2 (Sept. 12, 1958), http://undocs.org/E/CONF.26/SR.25 (last visited on May 
26, 2021, 12:17 PM) (summary of the Convention’s improvements by Mr. 
Schurmann, the President of the Conference meeting at the Headquarters of 
the United Nations in New York from 20 May to 10 June 1958).  
15  Richard Kreindler & Kristina van der Linden, Arbitration, Recognition of 
Awards, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 117, 120 (J. 
Basedow et al. eds., 2017). 
16  Id. 
17  Parsons, at 973. 




courts and commentators consider the New York Convention as being informed by 
a “general pro-enforcement bias.”19  
A. The New York Convention’s Pro-Enforcement Bias and the 
Limited Grounds for Refusing Recognition and Enforcement 
The Convention’s general pro-enforcement stance is acknowledged by all 
Contracting States to the Convention.20  It is derived mainly from the interplay 
between Articles III21 and V of the Convention.22  Article III of the New York 
Convention “sets forth the duty to ‘recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce 
them,’ [which has been] construed . . . as an expression of the New York 
Convention’s presumption in favour of recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards.”23  Article V, on the other hand, “sets forth the limited and exhaustive 
grounds on which recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused 
 
19  Id.  
20  For case law overviews, see, e.g., Angela T. Grahame & David R. Parratt, The 
Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards - Is there a 
“Pro-Enforcement Bias” in the English Courts?, 1 J. Enforce. Arb. Awards 
37 (2019); David Kwok, Pro-enforcement Bias by Hong Kong Courts: The 
Use of Indemnity Costs, 32 J. Int’l Arb. 677 (2015). 
21  See also Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 
F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002) (referring to Article III as illustrative of the 
fact that “the Convention and its implementing legislation have a pro-
enforcement bias”). 
22  See Cristina M. Mariottini & Burkhard Hess, The Notion of ‘Arbitral Award,’ 
in AUTONOMOUS VERSUS DOMESTIC CONCEPTS UNDER THE NEW YORK 
CONVENTION 27, 48 (F. Ferrari & F. Rosenfeld eds., 2021). 
23  FRANCO FERRARI & FRIEDRICH ROSENFELD, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 




by a competent authority in the Contracting State where recognition and 
enforcement is sought.”24  These grounds25 must be and are construed narrowly.26  
“This narrow interpretation of the Convention is in keeping with 9 U.S.C. § 207 
which unequivocally provides that a court in which enforcement of a foreign 
arbitration award is sought ‘shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds 
for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the 
said Convention’.”27  This clearly promotes the Convention’s pro-enforcement 
stance. 
 
24  UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT GUIDE ON THE CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION 
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS (New York, 1958) 124 
(G. Bermann & E. Gaillard eds., 2016) [hereafter, ‘UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT 
GUIDE’]. 
25  See, e.g., the decision of the Supreme Court for the United Kingdom in Dallah 
Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v Pakistan [2011] 1 AC 763, ¶ 101, per 
Lord Collins (“The New York Convention does not require double exequatur 
and the burden of proving the grounds for non-enforcement is firmly on the 
party resisting enforcement. Those grounds are exhaustive”).  See also 
TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(refusal of enforcement “only on the grounds explicitly set forth in Article 
V”). 
26  See China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co., v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 
274, 283 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Arbitration Between Exceed Int’l Ltd. v. DSL 
Corp., No. H–13–2572, 2014 WL 1761264, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2014) 
(holding that “[c]ourts in the United States have held consistently that the 
Convention’s Article V defenses are enumerated and narrowly construed, so 
as to encourage enforcement of arbitral awards in international commercial 
contracts”). 




B. Consequences of the New York Convention’s Limited Grounds for 
Refusing Recognition and Enforcement 
Because under the Convention courts may not refuse recognition and 
enforcement of awards on grounds other than those listed in Article V,  
supplementing the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement would 
constitute a breach of the obligations under the Convention.  Doing so would also 
disregard the fact that “[a]s a matter of judicial prudence, courts should resolve 
ambiguities in treaties in a way that minimizes the risk of friction with the nation’s 
treaty partners.  A desire to avoid inadvertent breaches of international law is all the 
more important for treaties, for which correction of judicial error can be a difficult 
enterprise.”28  It is in light of this and the pro-enforcement policy underlying the 
Convention that all provisions of the Convention have to be interpreted, including 
Article VI.  
Article VI allows a secondary jurisdiction court, if it considers it proper, to 
adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award if an application for the setting 
aside or suspension of the award has been made to a court in the primary jurisdiction, 
and to order, on the application of the party seeking enforcement, the other party to 
give suitable security. 
 
28  Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence 




This provision grants the enforcement court discretion to adjourn the decision 
on enforcement; however, this discretion is not unfettered, despite occasional 
holdings to the contrary.29  The discretion is limited by the Convention’s general 
pro-enforcement attitude, which must guide the interpretation of all of the 
Convention’s provisions.  In other words, any decision to stay enforcement of an 
award must be “based on an ad hoc determination by the court, guided by the pro[-] 
enforcement attitude of the New York Convention.”30  This means that courts may 
not use their discretion to create even a rebuttable presumption31 that a set-aside 
application automatically leads to an adjournment of the decision on the enforcement 
 
29  See Ukrvneshprom State Foreign Econ. Enter. v. Tradeway, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 
10278 (RPP), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2827, *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1996) 
[hereafter, ‘Ukrvneshprom’]. 
30  Ramona Martinez, Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral 
Awards Under the United Nations Convention of 1958: The “Refusal” 
Provisions, 24 Int’l Law. 487, 506 (1990).  See also Rena Rico, Searching for 
Standards: Suspension of Enforcement Proceedings under Article VI of the 
New York Convention, 1 Asian Int’l Arb. J. 69, 81 (2005) (suggesting that 
courts take a broad approach “in the assessment of an Art VI application by 
looking into the legal and factual circumstances before it, bearing in mind the 
objectives of the Convention, rather than looking at factors external to the 
award such as the likelihood of success in the pending proceedings to set 
aside.”) [hereafter, ‘Rico’]. 
31  Reading into Article VI of the Convention a presumption, albeit a rebuttable 
one, would reverse the burden of proof, which, in light of the Convention’s 
pro-enforcement attitude, clearly rests on the party resisting confirmation; see, 
e.g., Gold Reserve, at 120 (“[t]he party resisting confirmation . . . bears the 
heavy burden of establishing that one of the grounds for denying confirmation 




of the award.32  Yet, such a presumption seems to be applied with increasing 
frequency by the federal courts in this Circuit.33  The Convention’s travaux 
préparatoires unequivocally show how inappropriate this presumption is:  the 
drafters of the Convention introduced Article VI to abolish the Geneva Convention's 
requirement that a foreign court refuse enforcement upon the mere application to set 
aside the award in the country where it was issued.  As explained by Mr. de Sydow, 
the Chairman of the Working Party drafting Article VI,  
to prevent an abuse of that provision by the losing party which may 
have started annulment proceedings without a valid reason purely to 
delay or frustrate the enforcement of the award, the enforcement 
authority should in such a case have the right either to enforce the award 
forthwith or to adjourn its enforcement only on the condition that the 
party opposing enforcement deposits a suitable security.34 
 
32  See Brian Sampson, Staying The Enforcement of Foreign Commercial 
Arbitral Awards: A Federal Practice Contravening the Purposes of the New 
York Convention, 26 Brook. J. Int’l L. 1839, 1853 (2001) (criticizing that 
“[t]he ‘unfettered discretion’ first articulated in Fertilizer Corp. of India is 
reduced to nothing more than an automatic stay, a policy, which if adopted 
unanimously by the federal courts, may spur all ‘arbitral losers’ to seek review 
by the competent authority in the jurisdiction of origin. A policy of an 
automatic stay is not endorsed by the language and purpose of the New York 
Convention. If it was, then a stay would be contingent merely upon the posting 
of security.”). 
33  See, e.g., Addendum B to Appellants’ Brief [pincite?] (illustrating that 73% 
of stay applications filed in the District of Columbia district court in the past 
three years have been granted). 
34  United Nations, Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, 
Summary Record of the Seventeenth Meeting, E/CONF.26/SR.17, at 4 (Sept. 





From this it follows that “the risk that the power to stay could be abused by 
disgruntled litigants . . . argues more for a cautious and prudent exercise of the 
power,”35 as acknowledged by those courts that do not routinely stay recognition 
and enforcement proceedings when set-aside proceedings are commenced in the 
primary jurisdiction.36  Such a presumption would be tantamount to reintroducing 
the double exequatur requirement that the New York Convention deliberately 
eliminated. 
The limits on an enforcing court’s discretion to stay enforcement also cannot 
be evaded by relying on domestic law or doctrines, as the District Court sought to 
do when it specified that “the New York Convention provision expressly authorizing 
a stay with posting of a bond . . . is not applicable here since the Court is relying on 
its inherent authority to control its docket by issuing a second stay.”37  In relation to 
 
35  Ukrvneshprom, at *19-20 (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101, 
106 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
36  See, e.g., Dunav Re A.D.O. Beograd v. Dutch Marine Ins. B.V., Court of 
Appeal, The Hague, Netherlands, No. 200.223.489/01, April 17, 2018,  XLIII 
YB Comm. Arb. 535, ¶ 17 (2018) (“DMI bases its request for a stay only on 
the fact that a proceeding is pending in Serbia for the annulment of the arbitral 
award. Taking also into account that the Convention is based on a presumption 
of enforcement, that circumstance is insufficient to justify a stay. This request 
shall therefore be denied.”); Pavan s.r.l. v. Leng d’Or SA, Court of First 
Instance, Rubi, Spain, no. 3, Exequatur No. 584/06, June 11, 2007, XXXV 
YB Comm. Arb. 445, ¶ 19 (2010) (“Hence, it may be concluded that the fact 
that an annulment action is pending is not a sufficient ground for an automatic 
refusal to recognize the arbitral award.”). 




Convention awards, to the extent that the Convention addresses an issue, it preempts 
domestic law, unless the Convention itself provides otherwise, as it does, for 
example, in Article VII(1).  This also holds true as regards Article VI of the 
Convention, with the effect that the discretion courts enjoy is limited in the sense 
identified earlier.38 
An exercise in the discretion granted without taking into account the 
Convention’s regime set out above, which clearly limits that discretion, violates the 
United States’ obligations under the New York Convention.39  Therefore, courts 
condsidering a stay may resort only to criteria established in the New York 
Convention context, such as those specified in Europcar,40 “the first federal 
appellate opinion to subject the adjournment clause to a sustained analysis.”41  
Resort to different criteria, such as those relied upon by U.S. courts when exercising 
their domestic “inherent authority” to stay, is unwarranted and violates the United 
States’ obligations under the Convention, as well as the Convention’s very spirit. 
 
38  See, e.g., Nedagro B.V. v. Zao Konversbank, No. 02 Civ. 3946 (HB), 2003 
WL 151997, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003) (“[A] district court should not 
automatically stay enforcement proceedings on the ground that parallel 
proceedings are pending in the originating country.”).  
39  See supra Argument Section I(B). 
40  Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 
1998) [hereafter, ‘Europcar’]. 





C. The Court’s Discretion to Stay Enforcement of a New York 
Convention Award Must Be Exercised Reasonably, So as to 
Balance the Interests of Competing Parties and Consider the 
Likelihood of Success of Any Pending Set-Aside Application 
While Article VI does not expressly specify the criteria upon which a court 
should make the determination that it is “proper” to grant a stay, it is clear that the 
assessment must be more than simply asking whether a decision to set aside “is 
within the realm of possibility,” as the District Court did.42  If the only standard were 
whether the motion for set-aside is within the realm of the possible, it would simply 
serve as another avenue by which a court would effectively reintroduce a double 
exequatur requirement.   
 Individual courts, including courts in the United States, have assessed various 
factors in deciding whether or not to grant a stay.  While those factors vary 
somewhat, one consistent consideration is whether the set-aside application has a 
“likelihood” or “probability” of success.43  As one commentator noted after a 
thorough review of case law in multiple jurisdictions, including the United States:  
“[u]nder current case law, it appears that suspension of enforcement of an arbitral 
award which is subject to proceedings to set aside in the court of origin is dependent 
 
42  Hulley Enters. Ltd., at *9. 
43  For an overview of cases, see Nicola C. Port et al., Article VI, in RECOGNITION 
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS:  A GLOBAL 
COMMENTARY ON THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 415 (H. Kronke et al. eds., 




on the probable success of the latter proceedings.”44  Here, however, the District 
Court failed to make any assessment of the likelihood of success:  “[t]he 
Shareholders’ assessment of the merits of the Russian Federation’s appeal may be 
correct but this Court is not the appropriate forum to make that call, let alone make 
it first, before the Dutch Supreme Court has opined.”45  With respect, the enforcing 
court is absolutely the appropriate forum to “make that call” under the New York 
Convention.46  The D.C. Circuit itself has so noted:   
We agree with the Europcar court that a district court would abuse its 
discretion if it failed to consider the first and second factors. We think 
these factors directly implicate the court’s responsibility to “balance the 
 
44  Rico, supra n.30, at 70.  Rico’s conclusion is especially noteworthy given that 
she argues against a likelihood-of-success criterion. 
45  Hulley Enters. Ltd., at *9. 
46  The England and Wales Court of Appeal has noted the importance of the 
court’s making a judgment about the proceedings pending in the foreign court: 
 
The first [factor] is the strength of the argument that the award is 
invalid, as perceived on a brief consideration by the court which 
is asked to enforce the award while proceedings to set it aside are 
pending elsewhere. If the award is manifestly invalid, there 
should be an adjournment and no order for security; if it is 
manifestly valid, there should either be an order for immediate 
enforcement, or else an order for substantial security. In between 
there will be various degrees of plausibility in the argument for 
invalidity; and the Judge must be guided by his preliminary 
conclusion on the point.   
 Soleh Boneh Int’l Ltd. v. Uganda et al., [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 208, 212 




Convention’s policy favoring confirmation of arbitral awards against 
the principle of international comity embraced by the Convention.”47    
This approach is consistent with those taken in foreign New York Convention 
jurisdictions.  The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has noted:   
The circumstances of the concrete specific case are to be considered, 
namely also the prospects of success of the recourse proceeding. It 
would be inadmissible to deny the enforcement of a ‘binding’ arbitral 
award on the sole ground that there is a still pending recourse 
proceeding in the state of rendition.48   
 
 The Swiss Court thus emphasized the obligation to base the decision about 
staying enforcement on something more than the mere fact that a set-aside 
application is pending.   
 The Supreme Court of Austria emphasized that: 
A guideline for this discretionary decision is an examination whether 
the means of recourse in the country of origin has a prospect of success. 
. . . The commencement of annulment proceedings alone does not 
suffice.  Besides, the party resisting enforcement must explain 
 
47  Stileks, at 880.  While the D.C. Circuit has not yet endorsed Europcar in its 
totality, it has been widely followed by D.C. district courts and by courts 
across the United States.  See, e.g., Gold Reserve, at 134-35; Hardy Expl. & 
Prod. (India), Inc. v. Gov’t of India, Ministry of Petroleum & Nat. Gas, 314 
F. Supp. 3d 95, 105-108 (D.D.C. 2018) [hereafter, ‘Hardy Expl.’]; Compania 
de Inversiones Mercantiles, S.A. v. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua S.A.B. de 
C.V., 970 F.3d 1269, 1299 (10th Cir. 2020); Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. 
Antrix Corp., No. C18-1360 TSZ, 2020 WL 5569782, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sep. 
17, 2020) [hereafter, ‘Devas Multimedia Private Ltd.’]. 
48  X SA v. Y GmbH, Federal Supreme Court, Switzerland, Case No. 





concretely that its grounds for annulment (and recourse) actually 
should succeed, and why.49 
 
In The Netherlands, the jurisdiction where the set-aside petition is pending in 
connection with this case, courts are of a similar view:  “[t]his Court starts from the 
premise that the likelihood of success of [the request for] annulment or revocation is 
of great importance for (not) granting the request for suspension.”50  
In sum, the text of the Convention and the practice of courts in the United 
States and other Convention Contracting States all point to the obligation of an 
enforcing court to make a reasoned determination about whether to grant a stay, 
including by weighing the likelihood of success of any set-aside application against 
the interests of the award creditor and the overarching policy in favor of arbitration 
endorsed by the United States and by the world community in their embrace of the 
New York Convention.  Granting a stay without making such an assessment is 
contrary to the Convention, undermines its effectiveness, and departs not only from 
U.S. practice but from the practice of courts around the world. 
 
49  C Ltd. v. M GmbH, Supreme Court, Austria, Case No. 30b65/11x, Aug. 24, 
2011, XXXVIII YB Comm. Arb. 317, ¶ 56(2) (2013) (internal citations 
omitted). 
50  Russian Fed’n v. Everest Estate LLC et al., Court of Appeal, The Hague, 
Netherlands, Case No. 2019200.250.714-01, June 11, 2019, XLIV YB Comm. 




II. Article VI of the New York Convention Does Not Allow a Presumption 
Exempting Sovereign Parties from Giving Suitable Security 
Article VI of the New York Convention does not provide for any so-called 
“presumption.”  Article VI also does not distinguish between “parties” who are 
sovereign or non-sovereign.  Article I of the Convention makes the Convention 
applicable to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards arising out of 
“differences between persons, whether physical or legal,” thereby including States.51  
The plain text of Article VI of the New York Convention thus recognizes—without 
any limitation or qualification as to the nature of the “party”—that the party seeking 
an adjournment may also be ordered to give suitable security upon application by 
the party claiming enforcement.  
The Supreme Court has held that “[c]herry-picked generalizations from the 
negotiating and drafting history cannot be used to create a rule that finds no support 
in the treaty’s text.”52  In this instance, however, the travaux préparatoires are fully 
consistent with the text of the Convention and support the need for giving suitable 
security to safeguard against abusive, dilatory, or frivolous set-aside proceedings.53  
 
51  United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Committee on the 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, E/2704, E/AC.42/4/Rev.1, at 
6-7,  ¶ 20-24 (March 1955). 
52  GE Energy Power Conversion Fr. SAS Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, 
LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637, 1646 (2020). 




Accordingly, courts in foreign jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom,54 The 
Netherlands,55 Hong Kong,56 and the Cayman Islands,57 have applied to sovereigns 
the Article VI clause on giving suitable security, even if they differ as to what is 
suitable.  No “presumption” against ordering a sovereign to post security has been 
recognized in any foreign jurisdiction we are aware of that has interpreted Article 
VI of the New York Convention. 
United States courts also do not recognize any “presumption” against issuing 
orders for suitable security when the party seeking to stay enforcement is a 
sovereign.  Notably, the Second Circuit did not recognize any such presumption in 
Europcar when discussing the “suitable security” a party seeking enforcement may 
receive if enforcement is postponed under Article VI of the Convention.58  The 
emphasis on security is a calibrating or balancing mechanism responsive to the 
counterpart hardship that results from staying enforcement of an arbitral award:59  
 
54  Cont'l Transfert Technique Ltd. v. Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria, [2010] EWHC 780 
(Comm). 
55  S. Pac. Properties v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Dist. Court, Amsterdam, 
Netherlands, 12 July 1984, 24 ILM 1040 (1985).   
56  Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi 
Negara (otherwise known as Pertamina), [2003] 2 HKLR 381.  
57  The Republic of Gabon v. Swiss Oil Corp., Grand Court of Cayman Islands, 
June 17, 1988, XIV YB. Comm. Arb. 621 (1989). 
58  Europcar, at 318. 
59  See, e.g., Hardy Expl., at 108; Alto Mar Girassol v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. 
Co., No. 04–CV–7731, 2005 WL 947126 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2005); Spier v. 





“[t]he purpose of the Article VI stay provision pursuant to the New York 
Convention, ‘when coupled with the Article VI bond provision,’ is to ‘provide a 
judicially effective way of allowing litigation attacking an award to continue without 
endangering the financial interests of the award recipient.’”60  Foreign courts such 
as the United Kingdom Supreme Court uphold this rationale for Article VI:  
“[s]ecurity pending the outcome of foreign proceedings is, in effect, the price of an 
adjournment which an award debtor is seeking . . .”61   
This Court62 set as its own policy that “[a]s a general matter, we will enforce 
an arbitration award unless given a compelling reason to suspect that the award 
resulted from an unfair process,”63 and thus will even “enforce an annulled award  
. . . if the annulment is ‘repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just’ 
in the United States.”64  Consistent with its own pro-enforcement policy, this  
 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1988); Inversiones Samekh, Sociedad Anonima v. Hot 
Springs Inv. LLC,  No. 10-24000-CV-ALTONAGA/BROWN, 2011 WL 
13221000 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2011); Aperture Software GMBH v. Avocent 
Huntsville Corp., No. 5:14-cv-00211-JHE, 2015 WL 12838967 (N.D. Ala. 
Jan. 5, 2015). 
60  Nexteer Auto. Corp. v. Korea Delphi Auto. Sys. Corp., No. 13-CV-15189, 
2018 WL 1291132, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 2018). 
61  IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp. [2017] UKSC 16, ¶ 
28. 
62  Diag Human, S.E. v. Czech Republic – Ministry of Health, 824 F.3d 131 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016). 
63  Republic of Argentina v. AWG Grp. Ltd., 894 F.3d 327, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 




Court held in Belize Social Development Limited65 that a district court “exceeded the 
bounds of any inherent authority” when it issued a stay of enforcement that was “not 
in conformity with federal law and international commitments [under the New York 
Convention].”66   
Giving suitable security is one such commitment expressly provided for in 
Article VI of the New York Convention, one that tempers the hardships of a stay of 
enforcement in its deviation from the default rule in the United States that 
“enforcement of the arbitral award is fully consistent with the public policy of the 
United States . . . the ‘emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute 
resolution.’”67  It is even more urgent when “ . . . the delayed enforcement of the 
Award, particularly given the amount of money at issue, has burdened Petitioner, 
which to date has not received any ‘suitable security.’”68  Thus, “[t]he implication 
of Article VI is that a party who fails to post bond (and thus fails to protect its 
proceedings to vacate in the primary jurisdiction) risks losing the benefit of any 
superior force the primary jurisdiction would otherwise have had, and takes its 
chances in the secondary-jurisdiction court.”69 
 
65  Belize Soc. Dev. Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 668 F.3d 724, 733 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
66  Id. 
67  Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, 795 F.3d 
200, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
68  Devas Multimedia Private Ltd., at *4. 
69  Ingaseosas Int’l Corp. v. Aconcagua Investing Ltd., 479 F. App'x 955, 961 




The Supreme Court does not lightly infer “[p]resumptions of law”, which bear 
the high threshold of “suppositions or opinions previously formed on questions of 
frequent occurrence, being found, from experience, to be generally accordant with 
truth, and remain of force until repelled by contrary evidence.”70  No such 
“presumption” against issuing an order for suitable security to a sovereign party 
seeking to stay enforcement under Article VI of the New York Convention has ever 
been established under United States law or recognized in federal jurisprudence, or 
by any foreign court jurisdiction we are aware of that has interpreted Article VI of 
the New York Convention.  Courts in this Circuit, however, “generally have not 
required foreign sovereigns to post security because they are ‘presumably . . . solvent 
and will comply with legitimate orders issued by courts in this country or in [their 
home jurisdiction.].’”71  This practice as a matter of principle has no basis in the 
New York Convention and therefore should not be applied.  The difficulty of judicial 
determinations about a sovereign’s solvency and compliance records explains why 
other district courts and the Courts of Appeals in other Circuits instead require 
 
70  Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 45 U.S. 591, 599 (1846). 
71  CEF Energia, B.V. v. Italian Republic, No. 19-cv-3443 (KBJ), 2020 WL 
4219786, at *7 (D.D.C. Jul. 23, 2020), citing Novenergia II – Energy & Env’t 
(SCA) v. The Kingdom of Spain, No. 18-cv-01148 (TSC), 2020 WL 417794, 
at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 2020) (quoting DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 774 




sovereigns to post suitable security pursuant to Article VI of the New York 
Convention.72 
In other contexts, this Court has specifically declined to read alleged 
“doctrines” into the text of the New York Convention.73  It should likewise decline 
to create a “presumption” that is nowhere present in the text of Article VI of the New 
York Convention.  Creating by judicial fiat this so-called “presumption,” without 
any basis whatsoever in the text of Article VI of the Convention or in the law and 
jurisprudence of the United States, introduces considerable uncertainty to the whole 
New York Convention.  This rekindles a “dicey atmosphere of such a legal no-
man’s-land [as] would surely damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, 
and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international 
commercial agreements.”74   
 
72  Skandia Am. Reinsurance Corp. v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Segoro, No. 96 
Civ. 2301 (KMW), 1997 WL 278054, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1997) (“In 
light of the purpose of the New York Convention and the Second Circuit’s 
instruction to interpret the New York Convention broadly, I find that Article 
VI of the New York Convention allows me to require sovereigns to post pre-
judgment security if they move to set aside or suspend an arbitration award  
. . . ”); Caribbean Trading and Fid. Corp. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 
948 F.2d 111, 114-115 (2d Cir. 1991). 
73  BCB Holdings Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 650 F. App'x 17, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
74  Scherk, at 517. 
26 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment below is contrary to the collective and individual post-
ratification understandings of Article VI of the New York Convention by its 
Contracting States, including the United States.  The Court should reverse and 
remand for further proceedings on whether a stay of enforcement is warranted, and 
whether such a stay should be accompanied by an order of security for costs. 
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